Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe by Bowers, Stephen R
Liberty University
DigitalCommons@Liberty
University
Faculty Publications and Presentations Helms School of Government
1997
Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe
Stephen R. Bowers
Liberty University, srbowers2@liberty.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs
Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bowers, Stephen R., "Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe" (1997). Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 199.
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/199
104 Beyond the Soviet Union 
18 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism 
nuclear weapons will be carried out in Ukraine and Belarus by their 
governments - with Russian participation and the joint supervision of all the 
States of the "Commonwealth". 
The a~ticle underlines continued disagreements on the future of the existing 
conventIOnal forces: their size, subordination, armament and deployment. 
However, a possible compromise might emerge involving the creation of a 
"task-force" led by the temporary Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of Aviation 
Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, with the aim of producing a plan - in the two months 
he has at his disposal in that post. This aims to separate those conventional 
forces' which have "supra-national" tasks, and therefore could come under 
~ome f?rm. of Central Command, fro~ purely national forces now coming 
Into being Independently - as decreed In Ukraine from 3 January 1992. More 
agreement was reached on the future of the former KGB Frontier Guards: 
they are now to be placed under their own Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-
General Kolinichenko, as a separate command in agreement with the appro-
priate Republics. 
Finally, the article poses the question: "will those responsible for solving 
our defence problems really work hard for responsible solutions relevant to 
the "Commonwealth", or will they just engage in endless talk?" We cannot 
answer this question yet. But. in defence matters as well as in the political, 
~conomic and social demands of a new system of government in newly-
Independent states trying to build upon the ruins of the former dictatorship 
of the Communist Party, the Nomenklatura and the Secret Police, is there a 
place for a word of optimism? It is, hopefully, possible that as the new entities 
f~ce their problems, some of them intensified by national independence, the 
VIrtues of some form of inter-dependence may make their appearance. For 
example inter-dependence could have a role in dealing with food production 
and distribution; in electricity, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the oil and 
gas indu.stries; and in the struggle against crime, drug enforcement policies, 
and against the remnants of the old system in corruption and "mafia-like" 
?perations for the benefit of the few. The severity of the climate, especially 
In the north and the east, could also playa part in bringing former colleagues 
wh<;> for the time being have become nationalist enemies, together again for 
theIr own. good and that of their peoples. Loose association could emerge on 
these tOpICS: and such co-operations, if it succeeded in civilian and economic 
areas~ could be extended into the defence field. Russia - and her neighbours-
have I~ the past been through a "time of troubles" - and certainly are doing 
so again today. Might this not lead to a genuine search for improved co-
operation. between the independent states on these problems - motivated by 
a ~eal deSIre to shield their populations from the disastrous effects of allowing 
thIS present "time of troubles" to continue for too long? 
[5] 
Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe 
Stephen R. Bowers 
The eruption of full-scale war in Yugoslavia in 1991 sounded an alarm about 
the dire consequences of ethnic conflict throughout this once communist party 
dominated region. Organised warfare between Croatians and Serbians, 
producing an estimated 6,000 deaths by January of this year, raises serious 
questions about the future of East Europe's post-communist order. Yet, 
fighting in Yugoslavia is not the only indication that in post-communist Eastern 
Europe ethnic strife is increasingly the focus of political confrontations. 
Violent clashes between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, ethnic 
tensions between Bulgarians and that country's Turkish minority, secessionist 
movements in C~echoslovakia, irredentist demands on regions of a disintegrat-
ing Soviet Union, and a rising tide of anti-Semitic sentiments throughout the 
region are testimony to the fact that ethnicity is going to be a routine concern 
of post-communist politics in Eastern Europe. 
WHAT IS ETHNIC POLITICS? 
It is important to note at the outset that ethnicity cannot be described as the 
single common denominator of politics in any of the East European states. 
Even in Yugoslavia, the most severely and bitterly fragmented nation in this 
region, there are other factors driving political debate. In every country people 
are playing roles that are independent of their ethnic identities. Yet, ethnicity 
permeates a wide variety of issues. Education is one of the best examples of 
this as conflicts over the language of instruction constitute one of the most 
ethnically divisive issues in Eastern Europe. Violent disputes in Romania 
after the 1989 revolution often called attention to this question as the 
Hungarian minority fought against what it saw as Romanian encroachments 
on the operation of Hungarian language schools, especially in the country's 
many Hungarian communities. During the 1991 elections, Bulgaria's Move-
ment for Rights and Freedoms, an ethnically Turkish based party, called for 
a boycott of schools as a way of protesting against a decision by the Bulgarian 
legislature to revoke a law which had allowed the optional study of Turkish 
in public schools. The parents of Bulgarian school children had called for a 
boycott to protest about the introduction of optional Turkish c1asses. l In 
ethnically divided states issues ranging from education to land ~eform can 
quickly become ethnic disputes if group interests appear to be at fIsk. 
Issues which have taken on an ethnic "flavour" fall into that category 
referred to as ethnic politics. Political issues and activism may be described 
as ethnic when conducted within the context of an ethnic community or as an 
expression of ethnic interests. In connection with this, there are several other 
concerns which relate either directly or indirectly to ethnicity. Among the 
1 
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most prominent is nationalism. As is discussed below, nationalism, in its most 
basic and philosophical sense, is a sentiment supposed to have been submerged 
by four decades of "internationalist" rule in Eastern Europe. Cultural concerns 
also figure prominently in ethnic politics. While not synonymous with ethnicity, 
most ethnic groups claim distinctive cultural traditions and practices. Policies 
affecting those cultural expressions of ethnicity produce a disruptive and often 
violent brand of ethnic politics. Fimi.lly, religion, another frequent component 
of ethnic identity, also touches on questions that can be described as ethnic 
politics. All of these concerns were raised by Todor Zhivkov's treatment of 
Bulgaria's large Turkish minority during his years of absolute authority. As a 
result of his policies, ethnic Turks were denied the right to speak or study 
their native language, to maintain Islamic religious practices, or to honour 
Turkish traditions. In 1989 an estimated 100 Turks were killed in clashes 
with authorities and, eventually, over 300,000 Turks, most of whom were 
agricultural workers, emigrated to Turkey, thus adding to Bulgaria's interna-
tional embarrassment while also placing severe strains on its economy. Ahmed 
Dogan, leader of Bulgaria's Turkish based political party, characterised 
Zhivkov's anti-Turkish policies as genocide. 2 
One might ask why the term ethnic politics should be used in this context 
instead of the more common term ethnic conflict. Describing this phenomenon 
as ethnic politics is meant to imply that conventional ethnic conflict has taken 
a more organised form and has gone beyond the level of disorganised or 
sporadic confrontations. A street fight between rival ethnic groups is merely 
conflict; when groups organise parties to oppose each other, it is politics. 
NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The key element in the foundation of the modern state is nationalism, a 
passionate popular identification with the state based on territory, language, 
culture, and a sense of being unique as a people. Traditionally governments 
have encouraged nationalism because its existence strengthens the state 
especially in time of war when troops inspired by nationalistic fervour fight 
with an intensity that makes them far stronger than might otherwise be 
the case. With the proliferation of nation-states in modern times, the 
correspondence between the nation - what might be thought of as an ethnic 
concept - and the state - a legal entity - has become a loose and imprecise 
one. Consequently, nationalism, thought of as the right of a people who feel 
that they have a common nationality also to have a state that matches their 
nationality, became a triumphant philosophy of the 20th century. 
For the communist party states of Eastern Europe, nationalism was a 
troubling concept because, in Marxist-Leninist terms, it was a "bourgeois 
principle" that expressed itself in isolationist and warlike tendencies. Under 
the force of mandatory internationalism, almost any expression of nationalism 
was prohibited. For East Europeans, communism was by its very nature anti-
national and feelings of nationalism were suppressed by governments allied 
with the Soviet Union. As the USSR promoted Soviet interests in Eastern 
Europe, it often did so at the expense of the local regimes which, because of 
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their acquiescence in Soviet policies, came to be viewed as anti-national. 
Soviet efforts to solidify their control over the region, measures that involved 
both political and military interference, exacerbated a virulent nationalism 
among people who all too often had been traditionally anti-Russian long 
before the arrival of Soviet troops at the end of the Second World War. 
The complexity of East European nationalism is further enhanced by the 
fact that throughout the region there are numerous groups distinguished by 
language, culture, and an enduring sense of their uniqueness. Because of this 
strong sense of identity, they have resisted amalgamation into the regional 
and national units alongside which they have been forced to coexist. For many 
of these people, the correspondence between nation and state has been 
extremely fragile. Not surprisingly, there are numerous conflicts about the 
existence of nations when those nations, at least in part, may have been 
products of the will of foreign governments. Czechoslovakia, for example, 
emerged as a state in 1918, not simply as a result of the will of Czech and 
Slovak diplomats, but also because of decisions made by the victorious powers 
after the First World War. International conferences held in the United States 
at Cleveland and at Pittsburgh produced the agreements that created the state 
of Czechoslovakia. According to Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel 
and others, these agreements have not been observed, thus raising legitimate 
questions about the present structure of the state. 3 Perceptions such as these 
have generated a brand of ethnic politics that has had a disruptive impact on 
the political development of the region since the revolutions of 1989. 
Outsiders' awareness of East European ethnic politics was sharpened by 
the realisation that four decades of communism had failed to eradicate the 
national consciousness of minority groups. This failure is especially striking 
because communism was, if anything, characterised by an unflagging commit-
ment to the notion of internationalism and the removal of the so-called "false-
consciousness" of nationalism. Yet, in spite of pressures by regimes that set 
out to create a "new socialist man" who would identify with his class, the 
party's leadership, and the leadership of the USSR, nationalism, in its most 
brittle and even violent expressions, endured. The Slovak situation is typical 
of much of Eastern Europe. According to one account, since the revolution 
Slovakia has experienced an "avalanche of awakened national awareness" 
that is sweeping Slovakia toward secession from the Czechoslovakian Federal 
Republic. 4 Elsewhere in Eastern Europe there has been a proliferation of 
movements and parties founded on some notion of ethnic exclusiveness. Thus, 
with the end of socialism, it is nationalism that stands amid the ruins of 
communist party systems that promised to eliminate the phenomenon of 
nationalism. In this new environment, the de-stabilising influence of ethnic 
tension has emerged as a dominant political and social factor. 
WHY HAS ETHNIC POLITICS APPEARED NOW? 
An important question for consideration is why has ethnic politics emerged as 
such an important factor in Eastern Europe at this particular time? Several points 
are crucial in explaining this phenomenon. One of the most important is the 
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failure of the East European regimes established after the Second World War 
to develop a sense of legitimacy. By considering how most of the communist 
regimes were established in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World 
War, we get a clear picture of governments coming into existence as expressions, 
not of popular will, but of Soviet policy. Throughout the region, leaders 
were installed in office after having spent the turbulent war years in 
Moscow where they acquired blatant Soviet orientations on most issues of 
n'ational development. It is, therefore, not surprising that the governments 
of Eastern Europe were generally regarded as devoid of legitimacy. For 
that generation of leaders, the key to survival was the cultivation of Mos-
cow rather than meeting the demands of a local constituency. Todor Zhivkov of 
Bulgaria and Walter Ulbricht of the German Democratic Republic are 
among the best illustrations of this important and eventually fatal flaw. 
As one considers the failure of the old communist order, it is important to 
note that the new post-communist order is experiencing some significant 
disappointments and that these setbacks often promote a greater ethnic 
consciousness as an element of popular anxiety. Since the collapse of 
communist power in Poland in 1989, non-communist administrations, pursuing 
"shock therapy" as a way of re-structuring the economic system, have 
generated considerable opposition. In the parliamentary elections on 27 
October 1991, it became obvious that popular discontent was beginning to 
have some electoral impact. While the Solidarity "establishment" emerged 
victorious in those elections, there were some surprisingly strong showings by 
other parties. One of the most successful of those minor parties was the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland which received 7.5 per cent of the 
popular vote and won 10 per cent of the seats in the 460-member Sejm and 
four seats in the 1OO-member Senate. Founded in 1979 by Polish journalist 
Leszek Moczulski, the Confederation is Poland's oldest non-communist party. 
The Confederation's programme shows the appeal of Polish nationalism 
among many voters. Often accused of anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the 
Confederation has long advocated Polish sovereignty and defended the rights 
of ethnic minorities while also supporting nationalist independence movements 
in the Ukraine, Belomssia, and the Baltic states. Moczulski has frequently 
denounced the Germans whom he fears are buying an excessive amount of 
property in Poland. The Confederation was joined by the Catholic Action 
party, another strong minor party which received 8.7 per cent of the vote, 
whose programme calls for promotion of Polish "national" values and a close 
co-operation between Church and state. Other parties with sympathetic views 
fared well in those elections as, according to some reports, the bloc of Christian 
parties - the Centre Citizens Accord, the Catholic Election Campaign, and 
the Christian Democratic Party - emerged as the most successful of the post-
communist parties. Even the post-communist left, utilising, according to their 
critics, a variety of "extremist, ... demagogic slogans", did fairly well in the 
campaign.5 Together, the success of these parties indicates that ethnic concerns 
and related themes can assume a significant role if those parties credited with 
forcing the communists out of office fail in delivering the economic benefits 
sought by most voters. 
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A second reason for the appearance of ethnic politics is the failure of the 
international order of which the East European communist party states were 
components. The weakness of that international system was such that each 
regime was eventually forced to stand on its own. Economic problems alone 
would have been sufficient to produce a fatal weakening of the USSR's Eastern 
European system. As the Soviet leadership came to recognise that the burdens 
of an international empire were beyond Soviet economic capabilities, a reconsider-
ation of the USSR's commitments to Eastern Europe became inevitable. With 
Mikhail Gorbachev's renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and that doctrine's 
assertion of international responsibility for national affairs in Eastern Europe, 
the pressures upon the region's governments could not be endured. Many of 
those pressures were Soviet-generated. One of the most important was the 
USSR's inability to continue subsidies, both direct and indirect, to the economies 
of East European nations that were members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance. Consequently, East Europeans began to face rising energy costs that 
eroded the fragile basis of their economic well-being. In addition, the USSR's 
demands that its allies adopt reform measures that matched those of the Soviet 
Union placed weakened leaderships under additional political strains. Soviet 
sponsorship of Egon Krenz as a replacement for an ageing and obstinate Erich 
Honecker in the German Democratic Republic and Kremlin support for Petar 
Mladenov's Bulgarian coup helped set the stage for the revolutions that 
transformed Eastern Europe into an arena in which ethnic politics could flourish. 6 
East European nationalism, the driving force behind ethnic politics, is a 
function of tradition and the natural desire of a people to define themselves 
as a community. In this sense, ethnicity retains a contemporary utility for an 
Eastern Europe entering a post-communist era. Throughout the region one 
hears expressions of a desire to "rejoin" Europe, a Europe that has moved 
ahead of its eastern neighbours both economically and politically. Yet, the 
prospects for full and formal membership in bodies such as the European 
Community and the Council of Europe are limited, thus forcing East 
Europeans to place primary stress on their ethnic communities. They recognise 
that their political survival will be a function of an ability to consolidate a 
domestic consensus rather than a product of international ties. 
As Eastern Europe's communist order is being replaced by a new one, 
ethnic strife may be an unavoidable by-product of change. Studies of the 
process of modernisation have established the proposition that such an event, 
with its demand for new behavioural patterns, produces ethnic conflict.7 The 
systemic transformation of Eastern Europe is bringing profound changes not 
only in avenues for social advancement but also threats to the benefits that 
people have accumulated under communist regimes. The latter have usually 
been those of a more mundane and less spectacular nature such as retirement 
and housing benefits. As citizens began to see the new order as one in which 
old assumptions about social security were challenged, it was inevitable that 
the resultant stress would produce fears that would impinge on ethnic relations. 
In such an environment, nationalism is often transformed into hostility against 
ethnic minorities. 
The strength of an ethnic identification is intensified by the absence of other 
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unifying forces. The absence of real political parties during four decades of 
the dominance of the communist parties has left East Europeans without the 
institutional supports that might enable them to organise for effective collective 
action. In a similar fashion, churches in Eastern Europe, with the notable 
Polish exception, have not emerged as key actors in the post-communist era. 
In much of the region, clerical leaders have specifically disavowed political 
activism, thus surrendering the political battlefield to others. Romania's 
Timisoara Society, founded by religious activists in the city most associated 
with Romanian revolution, illustrates the difficulties that East European 
church leaders have had in transforming religious activism into political 
involvement. One of the country's most respected groups, the Timisoara 
Society resisted suggestions that it assume responsibilities for participation in 
the Romanian political process. 
The appearance of ethnic politics in Eastern Europe is, at least in part, a 
result of the elites who are replacing the leadership of the old order. Many of 
the region's new leaders survived the repression of the communist era as 
exponents of the interests of their particular ethnic community. Few East 
European parties illustrate this better than Bulgaria's Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (MRF), a well-organised, Turkish-based party that is the third 
largest block in the Bulgarian parliament. Efforts by Bulgarian authorities 
legally to ban the MRF from participation in Bulgarian politics, an effort to 
placate Bulgarian nationalists, resulted in international pressure on the 
government. When the Bulgarian Supreme Court confirmed the MRF's 
registration for the October 1991 elections, it sparked protests by various 
Bulgarian nationalists who oppose the MRF's political involvement. B In a 
similar fashion, Romanian Gypsies have also mobilised themselves as a 
political force and have become active participants in that country's political 
process. 
Finally, the emergence of vocal nationalism can be explained as a normal 
function of essentially free systems which allow individuals and groups to 
express their fears and frustrations and organise themselves in response to 
those anxieties. The collapse of governments which required "civility" between 
people who harboured traditional animosities toward each other has, as one 
would expect, been marked by an outpouring of long suppressed prejudice. 
For many people, racial and ethnic slurs, like pornography, are simply 
expressions of a new-found freedom. 
SOURCES OF ETHNIC TENSION 
There are several key sources of ethnic tension in Eastern Europe. Resentment 
of living under the rule of old adversaries is one of the most common and is 
intensified by memories of harsh methods associated with communist regimes. 
This resentment is further fuelled by the perception that policies of the central 
government, both in the communist and post-communist eras, aimed at a 
dilution of the group's cultural and ethnic identity. This was especially the 
case in Bulgaria during the mid-1980s as will be discussed below. An additional 
source of tension is the belief of numerous ethnic groups that they are superior 
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to others, especially those rival ethnic groups with whom the~ share territory 
or under whose rule they must live. Finally, ethnic tension IS generated by 
the perception of many of East Europe's larger ethnic groups that they have 
carried an undue burden in providing for the development of their nations 
while the smaller and perhaps poorer groups have become more or less 
"welfare" cases. Conversations with Czechs speaking of Slovaks frequently 
reveal this tendency. 
One of the most common features of ethnic politics is political activism by 
members of a particular ethnic group who see themselves as victims of their 
government's policies. This activism generally aims at moving governments 
to redress wrongs by implementing new policies. A second element of ethnic 
politics has a historical justification and attempts to establish territorial claims 
on the basis of determining who occupied a particular region at some time in 
the past. The Transylvanian and Ruthenian disputes illustrate this tendency. 
A third key element of ethnic politics is the cultural defence of group values 
such as language, educational rights, and customary dress. The general 
emphasis of ethnic politics is on the collective rights of groups as distinct from 
individual rights. 
The emergence of ethnic politics in Eastern Europe tests basic assumptions 
about the impact of social cleavage on the intensity of political hostility. As 
G. Bingham Powell, Jr. observed in his study of Austrian politics, members of 
"pure or cumulative cleavage groups, separated from their political opponents 
by lines of social class, religion . . ." and other status indicators tend to develop 
a deeper sense of "political hostility". Such individuals see opposition groups as 
"alien" and their relative isolation encourages the persistence of old grievances 
and fears over long periods of time and, with changing circumstances, leads to 
the development of new conflicts to supplement the old ones.9 Throughout 
Eastern Europe there are ethnic groups that exhibit the characteristics noted by 
Powell and their continued and even strengthened existence has become a central 
factor in post-communist politics in the region. 
East European nationalism has been further complicated by the fact that 
the region's borders do not clearly demarcate the diverse peoples of this part 
of Europe. Ethnic groups find themselves in overlapping communities with 
those people whom they regard as bitter historical enemies. The case of 
Transylvania illustrates this. As part of Romania, it has a large Hungarian 
population. Within Transylvania, Hungarian and Romanian communities 
are so interspersed that it is impossible to determine what is "Hungarian 
Transylvania" and what might be viewed as "Romanian Transylvania". The 
bloody clashes in Tirgu Mures in 1990 demonstrated the bitterness of 
Hungarian-Romanian contacts in this region. How so much of Eastern Europe 
arrived at such a condition can be seen from an examination of what happened 
to Hungary following the collapse of a powerful Hungarian state in the 19th 
century. It lost most of its territory, shrinking from 325,000 square miles to 
just over 90,000 square miles, losing its coast to Croatia, while its population 
dwindled from almost 21 million to less than 8 million. Many ethnic Magyars 
found themselves living outside Hungarian borders in Romania, Czechoslo-
vakia, and elsewhere, a situation which has persisted until the present day.1O 
112 Beyond the Soviet Union 
8 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism 
The complexity of East Europe's problems has been heightened by the 
existence of dispersed peoples such as Gypsies, Jews, Germans, and Hungari-
ans. These groups have historically generated both fear and prejudice among 
those who suspected the loyalty of such "foreign" elements. The Second 
World War and its aftermath did much to reduce the German and Jewish 
presence, but Gypsies remain as one of East Europe's most important ethnic 
groups. As such, Gypsies represent a continuing challenge to most East 
European political and social systems. The problems of the Gypsy communities 
place severe strains on the social systems of the nations in which they reside 
and their very presence is a source of fear for many people who complain 
that in their nation's new atmosphere of freedom they are afraid to go out on 
the streets at night because of Gypsies whom they see as threats. 
While the rest of Europe has also experienced ethnic tensions, East Europe 
continues to suffer from problems that have been relieved elsewhere on the 
continent. Unlike Western Europe, East Europe has not been blessed with 
strong systems that enjoyed the economic, political, and cultural power 
required to transform ethnic groups into subordinate elements of larger 
political orders. Consequently, ethnicity represents a challenge to East 
Europe that was long ago overcome by the more stable, prosperous West 
Europeans. 
In an earlier time, East Europe's ethnic mosaic contributed to the rise of 
communism just as it now threatens to inhibit the reconstruction of the old 
communist systems. In the inter-war period, support for communist parties 
was concentrated among people who felt that they had been treated unfairly 
and were the targets of discrimination. For example, communist voting was 
high among the Magyar population that lived outside Hungarian borders and 
represented a protest among ethnic injustice. The persistence of bitter ethnic 
animosities that aided the rise of communism constitutes one of the greatest 
threats to the region's struggling democratic orders. As East Europe passes 
into its first post-communist decade, there is reason to fear that the ethnic 
conflicts that promoted the establishment of communism may inhibit the 
growth of democratic orders. 
As the process of democratisation began in Eastern Europe, the region's 
ethnic conflicts intensified and became the focus of greater public scrutiny. 
Under communist systems, the official commitment to law and order kept 
ethnic disputes under control. Those who voiced ethnic frustrations and 
hostilities felt the full force of communist police power. Consequently, East 
Europe could bask in the deceptive glow of an ethnic harmony that was more 
apparent than real. Problems were not dealt with by the governments: the 
problems and those who called attention to them were suppressed. East 
Europe's ethnic peace was misleading and was the product, not of genuine 
harmony, but of brutal enforcement by leaders who proclaimed that the 
"new socialist man" had outgrown the false consciousness of particularist 
nationalism. 
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EAST EUROPE'S ETHNIC MOSAIC 
All countries in East Europe have significant minorities, a fact that makes 
each nation vulnerable to the disruptions of ethnic politics while two nations, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, are classified as multinational because of 
the absence of a clearly dominant ethnic community. The most ethnically 
homogenous are Poland (95 per cent Polish), Hungary (93 per cent Hungarian), 
and Albania (93 per cent Albanian). The largest minority groups are the 
Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia (4 per cent nationally but 12 per 
cent in Slovakia); the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (11 per cent nationally); 
the Hungarians in Romania (8 per cent); and the Albanians in Yugoslavia (8 
per cent nationally although most of them are in the Kosovo province where 
they constitute a clear majority).ll 
Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity is further complicated by the existence of a 
large Moslem community which constitutes 9 per cent of the national 
population. Bulgaria's difficult ethnic situation is exacerbated by the presence 
of Slavic Moslems known as Pomaks who make up 2 per cent of the country's 
population. Originally, both the Yugoslav Moslems and the Bulgarian Pomaks 
differed from their national majorities only in terms of religion. However, as 
a result of discriminatory state policies, they eventually developed a distinct 
national consciousness and became yet another component of East Europe's 
ethnic problem. 
Gypsies, as noted above, are another important element of East Europe's 
ethnic mosaic. Although rarely even counted as a distinct ethnic group until 
recently, there are large numbers of Gypsies throughout the region. Of 
Yugoslavia's population, almost 4 per cent are Gypsies; of Romania's, about 
5 per cent; of Hungary's and Bulgaria's, almost 7 per cent each. The Gypsy 
community in Czechoslovakia comprises about 5 per cent of its population 
and the one in Albania makes up almost 3 per cent of the national community. 
Poland has only about 20,000 Gypsies, less than 0.1 per cent. Regionally, the 
Gypsy population is growing fastest of all ethnic groups. Their problems are 
growing with equal rapidity; their isolated lifestyle, numerous health problems, 
a low literacy rate, and extensive criminal activities give the Gypsy community 
an unfavourable image among the general popUlation. Given a deep-seated 
anti-Gypsy bias throughout most of Eastern Europe, there is an understandable 
reluctance on the part of many census respondents to describe themselves as 
Gypsies. Consequently, the generally accepted figures for the Gypsy popula-
tions probably underestimate their real numbers. 
MAJOR ETHNIC CONFRONTATIONS 
The existence of such ethnic diversity has created numerous opportunities for 
conflict in Eastern Europe. In his examination of ethnic conflict in this region, 
Vladimir V. Kusin has identified four major ethnic confrontations. 12 The first 
is in Yugoslavia where the survival of this multinational state is threatened by 
bitter conflicts between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Hungarians, and Albanians. 
The intensity of Yugoslavia's ethnic strife, well before the outbreak of war in 
1991, was reflected in the existence of independent military organisations 
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throughout the country. By 1991, Slovenia had an army of 21,000 while the 
Croatian military force consisted of 35,000 well-armed men. Before open, 
organised hostilities began, violent attacks on neighbouring ethnic groups had 
become a routine feature of life in this nation which was often seen in 
structural and ethnic terms as a copy of the Soviet system. 13 
A second major ethnic confrontation is taking place in the Czechoslovakian 
Federal Republic, the region's other multinational state. Since the fall of its 
communist system, Czechoslovakia has been locked in a constitutional crisis 
produced by Czech-Slovak disputes. As a result, Czechoslovakia's federal 
system is under great pressure from a growing separatist movement in 
Slovakia. Separatist tendencies in Slovakia can be seen upon entering the 
country at Slovak crossing points which often fly the Slovak national flag 
rather than that of Czechoslovakia. Less subtle expressions of ethnic tension 
are seen in the threats of the "Slovak Republican Army" to destroy the dykes 
along the Danube river in order physically to destroy their ethnic rivals. 14 The 
political battle for Slovak independence is actively supported by the Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party and also enjoys the 
support of many deputies of the Christian Democratic Movement. 
Growing unemployment and rising inflation, coupled with the disintegration 
of the Civic Forum group, have intensified confrontations between rival groups 
that have little love for the Czech and Slovak union. IS The debate over the 
future of the Czechoslovak nation has steadily polarised a nation suffering 
fro~. an economic crisis that has eroded popular confidence in the domestic 
polICIes of the government. According to a survey in September 1991, 78 per 
cent of the citizens of the CSFR describe themselves as dissatisfied with their 
living standards. The level of dissatisfaction was highest - 88 per cent - in 
~Iova~ia. These concerns were matched by a declining level of popular trust 
III natIOnal ~nstitutions, including the Czechoslovak Army which, as recently 
as 1980, enjoyed the support and confidence of 48 per cent of the national 
population. More recent surveys show the level of trust in the army declining 
from 25 per cent in 1987, to 10 per cent in 1990 and, finally, 7 per cent in 
1991.16 Against this background of domestic discontent, there is growing 
support for the creation of an independent Slovakia. According to an October 
1991 s~rv~y by the Institute for Public Opinion Research, popular support 
for mamtaming the federation had fallen to 52 per cent in Slovakia in contrast 
~o yo per cent support for the federation in the Czech Republic. Surveys 
mdIca.te ~upport for completely independent Czech and Slovak military 
orgamsatIOns by 20 per cent of the Slovak population but only 3 per cent of 
the Czech population. 
While advocates of Slovak secession still constitute a minority, it is a vocal 
and often disruptive minority. On 29 October 1991, a Bratislava celebration 
of the anniversity of the founding of the Czechoslovakian state was broken 
up by hecklers who chanted "Enough of Havel" and threw eggs at the 
Czechoslovak president. The chairman of the Slovak National Unification 
Party, Jan Veselovsky, boasted that the incident was the "beginning of the 
end of the government coalition as well as a major defeat for President 
Havel" .17 Slovak politicians unwilling to support independence are facing 
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increasing pressure to join the secessionist movement. Those rejecting such a 
position are, in the words of one Bratislava newspaper, "plain traitors" who 
hide behind the "constitutional law on sovereignty" .18 Opponents of Slovakian 
independence routinely denounce "Slovak extremists" who have adopted the 
old communist slogan - "He who is not with us is against us!" - and enriched 
it with the references to the "final solution" so often spoken of by the pro-
Nazi separatist Slovak People's Party. Rita Klimova, the CSFR ambassador 
to the United States, has complained that in the turbulent Slovakian political 
environment there are increasing "manifestations of anti-Semitism" .19 A 
national referendum on the future of the Czechoslovakian state, more and 
more the subject of official discussion, is widely seen as an event that could 
promote unrest throughout the nation and would certainly produce an even 
wider polarisation of public opinion. 20 
Bulgaria is the site of another dramatic ethnic confrontation. In this Balkan 
country, national harmony has been disrupted by disputes between the 
1 million strong Turkish community and Bulgaria's majority. A turning point 
in Turkish-Bulgarian relations came in 1984-85 when Todor Zhivkov's 
government led a forced assimilation campaign that resulted in the exodus of 
approximately 300,000 Turks. During the campaign, Turks were denied such 
forms of national expression as wearing traditional forms of dress, speaking 
their language in public, and giving their children Turkish names. Eventually, 
many Turks returned as a result of US mediation that led to closer positive 
Bulgarian-Turkish relations on this issue. Yet, in spite of more enlightened 
post-communist policies, the dispute has persisted. Even the question of 
whether or not to designate Bulgaria as a "binational" state in recognition of 
the large Turkish minority has become a divisive political issue.21 
Finally, Hungarian activism - which has taken several forms, some provoca-
tive and some not - has been the focus of strife in Transylvania as well 
as eastern Slovakia and Yugoslavia. Educational concerns are a common 
expression of Hungarian activism and efforts to maintain Hungarian elements 
in local school curriculums have led to clashes with other groups. Such 
educational disputes fuelled ethnic violence in Tirgu Mures in 1990 when 
Hungarian-supplied textbooks were cited as having inspired anti-Romanian 
sentiments. It has also touched Ukraine where there is a large Hungarian 
minority in the Zakarpatskaya Oblast. The activities of ethnic Hungarians 
from the West, many of whom have travelled to Romania in an effort to 
assert what they see as Hungarian "collective rights", placed strains on 
relations between local Hungarians and the Romanian majority. In Yugoslavia, 
the major political party of Vojvodina's ethnic Hungarians is working to 
achieve cultural autonomy and minority self-rule, both central concerns of 
Hungarians throughout the region. 
There are several other distinct reflections of ethnicity as a political 
phenomenon in Eastern Europe. One of the most important is the proliferation 
of organisations to represent the interests of various ethnic groups. 
For example, in Romania shortly after the revolution, Romanian Gypsies 
created the Democratic Union of the Romanies as part of an effort to alter 
conditions of the Ceausescu period when Gypsies were ignored and denied 
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the official ethnic group status. The formation of the Democratic Union 
signalled the end of the Gypsies' traditional acceptance of anti-Gypsy bias in 
Romania.22 
A corresponding organisational effort has been made on behalf of Romania's 
ethnic Germans. The problems of ethnic Germans gained attention in 1990 
when emigration to Germany had reached an all-time high and in German 
areas of Transylvania entire villages were abandoned as residents exercised 
their rights to emigrate. The German communities remaining in Romania 
have, as a result, difficulties in maintaining traditional social structures, their 
religious communities have been devastated, and they are having problems 
in preserving the German school system because of shortages of both teachers 
and students. In 1990, approximately one half of Romania's 200,000-member 
ethnic German community, attracted by the vision of German prosperity in 
contrast to Romania's continuing desperate situation, emigrated to the Federal 
Republic. In 1991, despite appeals from both Bonn and Bucharest for the 
Germans to stay in their Romanian communities, the exodus continued. As 
part of an effort to improve the lot of ethnic Germans in Romania, Dr. Karl 
Singer helped to organise the Democratic Forum of Germans, a group whose 
present membership numbers 25,000. Minority "stabilisation programmes", 
an effort to offer incentives to stem the flow of Germans from Romania, have 
thus far had little impact on the exodus. 23 
Ethnically based political parties, very close in structure and function to 
the interest groups noted above, are another expression of ethnic politics. 
The first congress of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR) 
in April 1990 signalled the willingness of ethnic minorities to participate in 
politics as representatives of their national group. At its congress in Oradea, 
a Romanian city just 10 miles from the Hungarian frontier, the group 
announced its intention to place members in over three dozen legislative races 
in the 1990 Romanian elections. As an indication of the determination of 
Hungarian-Romanian citizens to avoid political isolation, much of the HDUR's 
leadership supported the ruling National Salvation Front, a move that angered 
many HDUR supporters and prompted the HDUR president to offer his 
resignation. 24 Bulgaria's Movement for Rights and Freedoms, discussed below, 
is the third most powerful political party in the Bulgarian parliament and 
further evidence of the success of ethnically-based political parties. 
As ethnically-based political movements generate a high level of activism 
by formerly suppressed ethnic communities, there is a growing and natural 
reaction against their political involvement. For political forces hostile to the 
concept of democracy, the anti-minority tendencies of many East Europeans 
present not only an important electoral opportunity but also a chance, perhaps, 
to doom the region's democratic experiments to failure. In Bulgaria, the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party, the successor to the old Bulgarian Communist Party, 
has effectively played an anti-Turkish card in both the 1990 and 1991 election 
campaigns.25 ' 
The appearance of ethnically-based political parties as well as other parties 
that utilise ethnic themes has also aroused considerable opposition among 
those who express genuine concern for the future of democracy in Eastern 
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Europe. Bulgarian legislation banning ethnic political parties, supported by 
the Union of Democratic Forces, has been motivated not only by anti-Turkish 
feelings but also by fears of an ethnic polarisation that could cripple democratic 
development in Bulgaria. This concern is often reflected in opposition to the 
notion of collective minority rights in contrast to individual rights. Deputy 
Senate President Vasile Mois expressed his opposition to the collective rights 
concept with his assertion that only by treating minority concerns in a calm, 
restrained manner could a nation avoid an exacerbation of "sensitive" 
concerns. Excessive public debate, he maintained, simply provides "free 
advertisements" for those who would generate ethnic strife.26 
In Romania two growing political parties, the Romania Mare (or Greater 
Romania) Party and the Vatra Romaneasca, are demonstrating the political 
potency of popular anxieties about the process of change. The Romania Mare 
Party, with a membership of approximately 100,000, is associated with the 
weekly journal Romania Mare, one of the country's two most popular 
periodicals. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the party's president, enjoys the dis-
tinction of having been sued for libel 90 times in just one year as a result of 
inflamatory articles written for Romania Mare. Along with the paper's editor 
Eugen Barbu, Tudor was closely allied with both Ceausescu and the Securitate, 
Ceausescu's dreaded secret police. Following a lengthy period of cordial 
relations with Romania's National Salvation Front, the paper broke with the 
government after former ally Prime Minister Petre Roman, concerned about 
Romania's international image, denounced the paper as a "racist and chauvinis-
tic" publication that should be banned. Consequently, Tudor declared that 
Roman, as Romania's first Jewish Prime Minister, was incapable of hearing 
the "voice of the blood" heard by ethnic Romanians concerned about the 
country's explosive situation. The Greater Romania Party ideology calls for 
a more positive evaluation of the country's communist period and denounces 
Romania's historical enemies who seek the country's dismemberment. Hun-
gary, of course, is regarded as the most dangerous historical enemy although 
the international community in general is viewed as anti-Romanian. The party 
also declares that there are internal "occult forces, . . . supported and 
manipulated from abroad" who support foreign adversaries. Ethnic minorities, 
in particular Hungarians, Jews, and Gypsies, are described as part of the anti-
Romanian conspiracy. The party programme calls for the creation of a 
government-sponsored Committee for the Investigation of Anti-Romanian 
Activities. In the view of the Romania Mare Party, the task of "national 
reconciliation" can only be accomplished by ethnic Romanians although 
minorities who are willing to denounce other ethnic minorities are given a 
place in party programmes. Through its youth organisation, the Romania 
Mare Party hopes to forge a new generation committed to the ideals of a 
Romanian "national socialism",27 Vatra Romaneasca (or Romanian Hearth) 
utilises similar themes and has worked with the Romania Mare Party. Vatra 
first attracted attention in March 1990 when it was credited with sparking the 
riots in Tirgu Mures. Vatra, closely connected with Ceausescu's Securitate, 
has worked to exploit Romanian fears that Hungarian demands for cultural 
autonomy are part of a campaign to strip Transylvania from Romania. 28 
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Frequent concerns about ethnic conflict have been expressed by Romanians 
alarmed by growing political extremism. In November 1991, the Romanian 
paper Romania Libera issued a demand for the General Prosecutor's Office 
to "deal with" the Romania Mare Party, not because of any "spectacular 
organisational events" for which it might have been responsible, but because 
it "has practised fierce extremist journalism". This kind of journalism 
according to Romania Libera, has "permitted domestic and foreign circle~ 
. to talk about the revival of Iron Guardism ... and about anti-Semitism 
in Romania .... " Even the Romanian Parliament has joined the chorus and 
in a Parliamentary resolution formally denounced extremism of any kind. 29 
Voting in elections in Eastern Europe has been increasingly reflective of 
ethnic boundaries. Studies of a Polish electoral campaign in Upper Silesia in 
1990 indicated that the vote for the "German" candidate corresponded to the 
share of the population that avows its Germanic origins and was limited to 
ethnically German electoral districts. 30 Ethnic voting has been especially 
pronounced in elections in Czechoslovakia where both Slovaks and Hungarians 
have used the electoral process to press their demands against the central 
government. Czechoslovakian electoral laws have recently been drawn in such 
a way as to discourage ethnic voting but the existence of numerous grievances 
perp~t~ates this pattern. Many politicians openly encourage voting along 
ethmc lmes, insisting that there is an "ethnic obligation" to do so. In Bulgaria, 
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has consistently demonstrated the 
cohe.sion of an ethnic community as certain districts are almost totally 
dommated by a party which is a distinct minority at the national level, winning 
only 7.5 per cent of the vote in the 1991 elections. 31 
The rise of ethnic politics has brought about numerous movements for at 
a minimum, cultural autonomy and, eventually, minority self-rule. Hungari~ns 
have beeD: especially active in this regard and in Serbia, acting through the 
Democratic Community of Vojvodina, have initiated a programme that is an 
atte~pt. to counter the republic's new constitution which severely limits 
provmclal self-government. Yugoslavia, in the period before its civil war 
began, was torn by movements of this nature as the Croatian Serbs, Moslems 
of southern Serbia, Serbs of Herzegovina, and the Albanians pursued a variety 
of programmes for self-determinationY 
ETHNIC CONFLICT AS AN INTERNATIONAL FACTOR 
Relations between the nations of Eastern Europe, as well as with those outside 
the region, have been affected by the increased activism of the area's 
many ethnic groups as ethnic conflicts have assumed an international form. 
Internati?nal relations have been affected in at least two ways. One is through 
the relatively passive, self-protective responses of nations concerned about 
preserving their interests in the face of events outside their borders. When 
ethnic u~rest 'in Yugoslavia escalated in 1991, raising the prospect of wide-
spread VIOlence, even warfare, throughout the nation, the Hungarian gov-
ernment responded by placing reinforcements on its border with Yugoslavia. 
Additional police guards were placed in border settlements in order to keep 
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"armed men on the other side of the border". The government also designated 
sites for refugee camps and initiated planning for compulsory visas for 
Yugoslavs wishing to enter Hungary. Consideration was even given to closing 
stretches of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border. Long delays at many border 
crossings had, for all practical purposes, the effect of closing stretches of the 
frontier. 33 Another Yugoslav neighbour, Romania, expressed its concern for 
Balkan stability during this time by placing the Romanian Army on alert. In 
making this announcement, Romanian Defence Minister Major General 
Constantin Nicolae Spiroiu expressed his concern that Yugoslavia's inter-
ethnic conflicts might threaten the stability of the entire Balkan region. 34 
A second way in which international relations have been affected by ethnic 
conflict has been the growing tendency of governments to address - perhaps 
even challenge or threaten - the leaderships of other nations in an effort to 
resolve ethnic concerns. This is often done in a confrontational manner. When 
the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania staged a congress on the 
Transylvanian issue in the Hungarian town of Eger, there was a series of 
protests by the Romanian legislature. As the conference delegates raised 
questions about the legal status of Transylvania, Romanian legislators declared 
that the meeting constituted a threat to the inviolability of Romania's frontiers. 
One member of the parliament, Augustin Botis of the National Salvation 
Front, demanded that the Romanian government should "penally punish 
those who disregard the national feeling" of Romanians by participating in 
conferences such as the Eger meeting. Others demanded that the Hungarian 
government take steps to prevent such "desecrations of Romanian dignity" 
in order to protect the "already highly fragile relations between Hungary and 
Romania .... " Romanian relations with both Poland and Hungary suffered 
in August 1991 when an obscure, apparently neocommunist Polish magazine, 
Sens, published an article that outlined plans for a Central European economic 
integration programme that included Transylvania but not the rest of Romania. 
Many Romanians accused the Hungarians of using their close relationship 
with the Polish government as part of a campaign to dismember Romania.35 
The Yugoslav civil war has raised the prospect of foreign intervention, often 
motivated by ethnic concerns, in this conflict. The Serbian government's 
insistence that Serbia must come to the aid of all Serbs, including those who 
live under an "oppressive" Croatian government, illustrates the destructive 
capacity of this tendency as well as growing confusion over the question of 
what is a nation.36 The plight of Bulgarian refugees has generated equally 
intense concerns by organisations seeking to protect their interests. In 
October 1991, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Union of 
Macedonian Societies issued a proclamation that it could not remain indifferent 
to the "threats made by Serbian chauvinists to occupy Macedonia and turn it 
into southern Serbia." Declaring that Macedonia was not alone in its struggle 
for freedom, the proclamation announced that the region would "be given 
support by patriotic Bulgarians all over the world". Events in Yugoslavia have 
prompted widespread denunciations of the communist regime's policy of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states because of 
perceptions that this meant neglecting the sufferings of Bulgarians living in 
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Yugoslavia. According to Bulgarian accounts, those displaced Bulgarians have 
lived in an anti-Bulgarian atmosphere "for decades". In spite of its expressions 
of concern, the Bulgarian government denies reports that it has been 
sending weapons into Yugoslavia. 37 Another Yugoslav neighbour, Albania, has 
expressed concern for the fate of its ethnic compatriots who are endangered 
by Yugoslav developments. On 7 October 1991, the Albanian leadership 
publically linked the Yugoslav crisis with developments in Kosovo and 
expressed concern about the southern drift of Serbian-Croatian fighting. 
Underscoring a fear of military incursions, the Albanian Army was placed on 
alert status along the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier. The Albanians have 
recognised Kosovo's declaration of independence and are using Albanian 
diplomacy in an effort to secure greater international recognition of Kosovo's 
full sovereignty. 38 
With growing concerns for displaced ethnic minorities now a common 
feature of most European foreign policies, the concept of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of another state seems to have been displaced by greater 
attention to minority rights. Reflecting German fears for the welfare of ethnic 
Germans in Romania, the Bonn government has, since the fall of Ceausescu, 
insisted that long-term German aid for Romania is dependent not only upon 
the democratisation of Romania but also upon Romania's treatment of its 
minorities. While the German government has maintained its "open door" 
policy toward ethnic Germans wishing to come to Germany, it has offered 
cultural and humanitarian aid in an effort to improve the lives of those who 
elect to remain in Romania.39 
Diplomatic recognition is another instrument that has appeared during the 
Yugoslav crisis which some might regard as "intervention". The question of 
Hungarian recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, given 
Hungary's geographic proximity to Yugoslavia, has been one of the most 
important concerns. Balazs Horvath, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum, the largest of the Hungarian governing parties, stated in October that 
his party supports not only immediate recognition of the secessionist republics 
but believes the government should use all its international influence to secure 
general recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence. Movements of 
Yugoslavian federal troops in the vicinity of the Hungarian frontier have 
threatened Hungary's diplomatic position. 40 The matter of recognition, accord-
ing to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, has been approached with considerable 
caution as the Hungarian government will extend diplomatic recognition to 
Slovenia and Croatia only after the EC nations make a positive decision. 
Hungary's caution has been motivated by a desire to maintain political and 
economic relations with Serbia and to protect the position of the Hungarian 
minority in Vojvodina. Croatian overtures to the Polish government brought 
an equally cautious approach. The Polish authorities, evidently adopting a 
position comparable to that of most European nations, indicated to the 
Croatian Foreign Minister that Poland planned to recognise Croatia and would 
offer the Croatians humanitarian assistance in the form of medicines.41 
While the violence of Yugoslavia's civil war has had an impact on several 
nations of the region, Bulgaria's treatment of its ethnic Turkish minority has 
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poisoned Bulgarian-Turkish relations for years. Territorial conflicts of the 
19th century, coupled with negative historical impressions produced by five 
centuries of Ottoman rule, have led most Bulgarians to view Turkey as their 
greatest enemy. For many Bulgarians, the large Turkish minority is an 
unpleasant reminder of those centuries of Ottoman domination. Throughout 
much of the past decade, the presence of over 1 million Turks in Bulgaria, 
many of whom were dispersed throughout the nation rather than congregated 
near the border with Turkey, raised the spectre of a Turkish invasion in order 
to "protect" this minority. Memories of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
when a Turkish minority was also an issue have given the Turkish "threat" 
the appearance of reality. Widespread coverage in the Bulgarian media of the 
anti-Islamic remarks made by Bulgaria's Prime Minister Dimitar Popov in 
1990 underscored the official distrust of many Bulgarian officials toward 
Turkey, the Turkish government, and Turkish traditions. Continuing incidents 
along the Bulgarian-Turkish border have heightened both popular as well as 
official fears of a threat to the nation's securityY 
More recent developments in Bulgarian-Turkish affairs, in particular the 
October 1991 election results, have demonstrated the international sensitivity 
of this situation. Following the election, a spokesman for the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms accused the Greek press and the Greek Foreign Ministry 
of "intervention" in Bulgaria's internal affairs. The specific actions constituting 
"intervention" were comments in Greek publications and a statement by the 
Greek Foreign Ministry expressing Greek fears of a deterioration in relations 
with Bulgaria because of the rising parliamentary influence of the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms, an organisation described by the Greeks as an 
"ethnic Turkish party". A declaration by the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
speaking of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as "compatriots" was 
cited in the Greek statement as evidence of the party's ties to Turkey.43 
Even old disputes have often returned to haunt new regimes as they attempt 
to formulate foreign policies that reflect contemporary needs. In the fall of 
1991, talks between the German and Czechoslovakian governments were 
disrupted by the question of how the Sudeten German minority was treated 
by the Czechoslovakian government at the end of the Second World War. 
On the eve of the meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Czechoslovak 
Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, Egon Lansky, spokesman of the CSFR Foreign 
Ministry was quoted as having said that the German government realised that 
the Sudeten Germans deserved their treatment and that there was no question 
of compensation for those who lost their property. Following initial reports 
of this statement, Lansky insisted that he had been misquoted and that he 
had always felt that the Sudeten Germans had been illegally deprived of their 
property.44 
In some cases governments have dealt with sensitive ethnic issues without 
assuming the confrontational tone of Bulgarian-Turkish or Hungarian-
Romanian relations. Yugoslav-Romanian contacts over the issue of Yugoslav 
minorities in Romania illustrate a non-confrontational mode of diplomacy. 
During a state visit to Yugoslavia in 1990, Romanian President Ion Iliescu 
agreed to a Yugoslav proposal for changing the position and rights of Yugoslav 
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minorities in Romania. Both the preservation of cultural traditions as well 
as resettlement were considered during Romanian-Yugoslav talks on this 
question. 45 This relatively successful excursion into ethnic diplomacy raises 
some hope that ethnic ties between the nations of Eastern Europe might at 
some future date become an instrument for promotion of positive relations 
or, at the very least, that problems can be managed without ~onfrontation. 
These expressions of ethnic politics have been made pOSSible by the entry 
into governments of advocates of ethnic causes and concerns. In the communist 
era, this phenomenon was virtually unknown because the Soviet Union's 
domination of those governments worked to suppress nationalistic expressions 
and protests. As loyal Marxist-Leninists, officials knew they should suppress 
expressions of concern over the fate of fellow-countrymen living within the 
borders of their East European allies. Non-interference was the watchword 
of "socialist" foreign policies and subordination to Moscow meant that the 
Soviets would have the final word on most cross-border ethnic concerns. Now, 
governments are increasingly under the control of people who feel an 
obligation to respond to popular concerns, including ethnic ones. Moreover, 
given the genuine popular feelings surrounding ethnic sensitivities in Eastern 
Europe, it is not surprising that individuals who were ethnic activists when 
the communists were in power have now risen to political prominence. 
As communist regimes worked to limit real political activism by forcing 
participation through officially approved organisations, "real politics" was 
increasingly limited to the underground activities of ethnic groups bound 
together by linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. 
THE SOVIET CONNECTION 
The East European situation, difficult enough by itself, has been aggravated 
by the continuing deterioration of the Soviet Union, a process which once 
again demonstrates the international dimensions of ethnic politics in Eastern 
Europe. There are several points of contention. First, there is a vocal Polish 
minority in Lithuania that has called for a "Polish national-territorial zone". 
As the Baltic situation began to unravel in 1991, their demands became more 
pronounced. Poles constitute 7.7 per cent of the population of Lithuania with 
approximately 160,000 members of the Polish community living in Vilnius. 
Lithuania's Poles feel that they have been discriminated against by the 
government's abolition of the Polish local councils in areas dominated by the 
Polish minOrity and that they are threatened by plans to enlarge Vilnius' city 
limits, thus diminishing Polish influence in the city. Because of the Poles' 
concerns for their fate in an independent Lithuania, many Lithuanians 
suggested that Poles were pro-Soviet, preferring to be Soviet citizens rather 
than Lithuanian citizens of Polish descent. Such accusations simply added to 
the Polish minority's already uncomfortable position. In an eff~rt to .relieve 
ethnic tensions between Lithuanians and Lithuanian-Poles, a Polish-Lithuan-
ian declaration was formulated in October 1991 by the foreign ministries of 
Poland and Lithuania. The declaration makes provisions for each nation to 
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care for the cultural and religious aspirations of minorities and to ensure that 
they have education in their native languages. Lithuanian .Supr~me .Council 
Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis supplemented the .decla~atl~n with h~s assur-
ances that the government did not regard the Pohsh mmonty as bemg pro-
communist. 46 
Second, there is the existence of irredentist problems along the USSR's 
western border. The most volatile of these today is in the Moldovan Republic, 
formerly known as the Moldavian Soviet Republic. Ethnic strife in Soviet 
Moldovo has affected Romania through its cultivation of pan-Romanian 
tendencies. The formation in 1990 of the "Pro Besarabia si Bucovina" cultural 
association in Romania, a group that seeks the "national integration of the 
spiritual, cultural, and artistic values. of th~ ~es~rabian and ~uc~)Vinian 
Romanians in the Daco-Roman space", IS one mdlcatlOn of Romaman mterest 
in this area. Romanian denunciations of the "imperialist occupation of the 
Republic of Moldovo" in January 1991, a!e another expres~ion of ~omaniah 
aspirations. The resolution of a joint sessIOn of the ~omaman parhament on 
24 June 1991 a condemnation of the Molotov-Rlbbentrop Pact and the 
territorial adj~stments that it brought, put the Romanian legislature on record 
as condemning the territorial status of Moldovo. A few days later an 
international conference in Chisinau, the Moldovan capitol, documented and 
denounced the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In September 
1991, following Moldovo's declaration o~ independence from the USSR, 
former Prime Minister Petre Roman descnbed the area as "one of the oldest 
Romanian areas" but insisted that the question of unification with Romania 
would have to be answered by the citizens of Moldovo themselves.47 Romanian 
interest has, in many respects, been reciprocated by the Mold~van governm.ent. 
Well befoi:e the failed Soviet coup, the Moldovan legislature officially 
encouraged the residents of Moldova to stage join~ cultu~al even~s wit~ 
neighbouring Romanian towns and to celebrate Romaman natIOnal hohdays. 
Separatist movements by the republic's other ethnic groups.' Ru~sians, Ukr~in­
ians, and the Gagauz, have escalated an already tense s.ltuatlOn and raIsed 
questions about whether Romania, a likely future nation-state home for 
Moldovo, wants to have a large Russian as well as a small Turkish minority. 
Many felt that the activism of Moldovo's minority might have been the result 
of KGB involvement in the republic before the 1991 coup attempt. 
Another irredentist situation, the dispute over Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 
pits Czechoslovakia against the Ukraine. As the Ukraine .moved toward 
independence from the Soviet Union, there were new expressIOns of concern 
about the fate of those former Czechoslovakian citizens now living in Ruthenia, 
a part of the USSR since 1945. The population of this re¥ion numbers 
approximately 1,200,000 people, 750,000 of whom are Rutheman.s. T~e rest 
are Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, and Slovaks ~s well as some Immigrants 
from Russia and the Ukraine.49 Recent documentatIOn of the abuse of human 
rights in Ruthenia and the Ukraine's refusal to recognise Ruthenia as a nation 
have led to efforts by many Ruthenians as well as Czechoslovakians to raise 
demands that the Prague government approach Soviet authorities about the 
Ruthenian situation. The demands of the Ruthenians are being advanced by 
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the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians which, early in 1991, led a delegation 
to Prague in order to present a petition to the Czechoslovak government. The 
fundamental demand presently advanced regarding Ruthenia is that it be 
allowed to conduct a referendum as the first step toward establishment of an 
independent republic. Ruthenians have also expressed a desire to be Roman 
Catholics once again, now a legal possibility, after years of being forced into 
membership of the Orthodox Church. A similar relationship exists between 
Hungary and the Soviet Union because of the large Hungarian minority in 
the area. The Hungarian government has recently opened a Hungarian 
Consulate in Ruthenia and is encouraging Hungarian economic investments 
in the region. 50 
Finally, the liberalisation of Soviet emigration laws, well underway by early 
1991, raised the prospect of thousands of Soviet citizens flooding into both 
Eastern and Western Europe in search of a better life. If the deterioration of 
the Soviet economy and the collapse of the Soviet state continue, this tendency 
could severely strain the weak social service systems existing in East Europe 
and further weaken the region's struggling democracies. Should that economic 
decline be matched by political disorder, the refugee problem could threaten 
every state on the Soviet periphery. 51 Anxiety about the USSR's situation was 
demonstrated by Soviet soldiers, many of whom resisted returning to the 
USSR as the Warsaw Pact military arrangements were terminated. When 
Soviet troops were withdrawing from Hungary, Poland, and Germany, many 
soldiers attempted to remain in those nations rather than face the uncertain 
prospect of life in their homeland. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
In a very general sense, most East European communist party regimes suffered 
from serious intellectual and philosophical shortcomings when dealing with 
ethnic issues. Being unable to build on nationalism as a source of legitimacy, 
they consistently underestimated the roles of nationalism, ethnicity, and all 
that went with it. Communism as an ideology failed to unite the many different 
"nations" of Eastern Europe but, because the regime refused to acknowledge 
the persistence of distinct national identities within their nations, no alternative 
programmes or proposals were advanced. Consequently, the post-communist 
regimes must now deal with a phenomenon that West Europeans faced long 
ago and attempt to resolve the challenges of nationalism that takes several 
different forms in most East European nations. 
Social mobility is a key concept in studies of the development of nations 
and makes possible the upward advancement of individuals from one group 
to another. Such mobility gives a successfully developing society a vitality that 
promotes growth. Ethnicity, however, is a static phenomenon to which the 
concept of mobility does not apply. Given the importance of ethnicity in East 
Europe, the prospects for political and social development are seriously 
limited. As citizens are generally unable to change ethnic affiliations, their 
advancement is likely to come only as a group and, more often than not, at 
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the expense of other groups seen as rivals. Such a condition sharpens social 
tensions, inhibits the peaceful evolution of society and encourages an obsession 
with collective rights at the expense of individual rights. 
There is considerable support for the Hungarian government's approach in 
dealing with national minorities. The Hungarian Constitution does not 
characterise individuals in terms of ethnic affiliation but deals with them as 
citizens who enjoy no special benefits, simply the rights and obligations of 
any Hungarian citizen. In discussing this approach at a joint meeting between 
Romanian and Hungarian Social Democrats in Budapest, Constantin Avram-
escu, deputy chairman of the Romanian Social Democratic Party, said minority 
problems can be dealt with only after the establishment of "real democracies", 
systems in which rights are assigned on an individual basis rather than on a 
group basis.52 While such an approach misses those ethnic concerns which 
focus on cultural or community values, matters requiring group treatment, it 
does facilitate mobility by allowing citizens to advance as individuals rather 
than simply as group members. 
In addition to the existence of sharply defined ethnic groups, there is an 
absence of overlapping group memberships in Eastern Europe. The trade 
unions and other professional associations of the communist period rarely 
brought the members of different ethnic groups together in any meaningful 
sense. Consequently, there are few successful shared experiences that create 
a sense of community that might serve to elevate popular consciousness above 
narrowly defined concerns that correspond to ethnicity. 
Eastern European ethnic groups suffer from a social and political isolation 
that generates ethnic antagonism. As Eastern Europe's borders have been 
stripped of their barbed wire and the armed guards who in the past prevented 
movements across those frontiers, thousands of ethnic Hungarians have fled 
Romania in order to be reunited with fellow Hungarians. At the same time, 
ethnic Germans are leaving East Europe in search of opportunities in a 
reunited Germany while Romanians are speaking of the common· bond 
between Romanians of Besarabia, Bucovina, and Romania itself. Debates 
about who is really Hungarian or Romanian and whether or not Czechs have 
really exploited Slovaks are serving to further isolate from each other the 
groups who share common East European homelands.53 Ethnic migrations 
have become commonplace as groups attempt to avoid living in close proximity 
to those other people who are viewed as enemies. 
While the situation is difficult, it would be worse if there was a coincidence 
of ethnicity and economic, political, or social status. Such an occurrence is 
relatively uncommon as deprivations have generally been shared by members 
of all of East Europe's ethnic groups. Throughout the Ceausescu period in 
Romania a common reply to charges of the government's mistreatment of the 
Hungarian minority was to observe that Ceausescu's regime mistreated 
everyone regardless of ethnic heritage. In a similar but more positive fashion, 
Poland's bishops issued a pastoral letter in 1991 dealing with the issue of anti-
Semitism, something that had been noted in Poland's presidential election 
campaign. In their letter, the bishops insisted that it was wrong to blame the 
Jews for the excesses of Stalinist officials because both Poles and Jews had 
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served in the Stalinist security forces in Poland and Poles as well as Jews had 
been victims of that system. 54 More recently, the economic difficulties of the 
reconstruction period seem to have been felt more or less equally by members 
of all ethnic groups. 
Finally, it is indisputable that Eastern Europe is fragmented by ethnic 
politics. The crucial question, however, is what is the impact of such a 
fragmentation? Viewing the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the growing 
pressures for a breakup of the Czechoslovakian nation, the region's only 
true multi-ethnic nation, encourages an assumption that the fragmentation 
produced by ethnic politics may inevitably lead to the further fragmentation 
of Eastern Europe's state structures. Yet, this trend may not be regionally 
pervasive. Outside Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, while there are strong 
ethnic tensions, there is substantial support for maintenance of the territorial 
status quo. Bulgaria, for example, torn by bitter ethnic strife that has worked 
its way into political discourse, enjoys a leadership that is working against 
separatist tendencies. Ahmed Dogan, the leader of Bulgaria's Turkish-based 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms, has declared his party's opposition to 
all demands for creation of separate states or autonomous regions. According 
to Dogan, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is concerned not only 
about the Turkish minority but also about the other minorities that make up 
the Bulgarian people. Describing his party's membership as "loyal Bulgarian 
citizens", Dogan declared the party's commitment to guaranteeing the "sove-
reignty and territorial integrity" of Bulgaria. The Movement's most basic 
demand, he has stated, is "recognition of the Turkish minority as a constructive 
force" helping Bulgaria to become part of the European community, something 
which is necessary in the development of "pluralism and genuine democracy". 55 
Ethnic strife is also conditioned by the lack of cohesion apparent in some 
ethnic group structures. According to a recent account of the three Hungarian 
political groups operating in Slovakia, the "Hungarian parties often hate each 
other more than the extreme right wing and the communists". The Hungarian 
press in Slovakia has also split and cannot arrive at a common interpretation 
of the most basic questions about the future of Czechoslovakia. 56 In a similar 
fashion, the Hungarian movement in Romania is divided over interpretations 
of what constitutes Hungarian interests in that country. Romania's Hungarians 
have adopted strategies which vary widely according to whether they are. 
acting as a national minority or as a local majority. In cases where they 
constitute a local majority, Hungarians have often adopted discriminatory 
policies against those Romanians finding themselves a minority in Hungarian 
communities. 57 Such tactical and programmatic diffusion diminishes the 
prospect that ethnic groups will form cohesive forces that will lobby effectively 
for autonomy or separatism. 
Much of contemporary interest in East European ethnic conflict is motivated 
by a concern for the prospects of widespread violence in Eastern Europe, 
perhaps along the lines of the Yugoslav model for social and political 
deterioration. As noted above, there are strong forces working for moderation 
in development of an approach to minority tensions. Yet, there are forces 
committed to a violent approach to ethnic problems, forces which may enjoy 
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support from the as yet una.ccounted for remnants of Eastern Europe's secret 
polIce apparatus. 58 The wIdespread availability of explosives in much of 
~astern Europe means that many of the instruments of violence are available 
ecent Czec~lOslovakian r~ports have revealed that Semtex, a Czechoslovak~ 
made explosIve popular wIth terrorists, is particularly easy to obtain because 
?f .t~e ver~ poor re~ord-keeping practices of many enterprises. Several IndlVIdua~s In posseSSIOn ?f large quantities of Semtex have recently been 
arrested In CzechoslovakIa.59 The widespread availability of Soviet arms 
many a~an?on~d or sold as the Soviet military leaves Eastern Europe i~ 
another IndIcatIO.n that the weapons of violence are available to groups incli~ed 
toward such actIOns. The. self-proclaimed Slovak Republican Army is one 
grou~ that openly ~nd WIt~OU~ reservations advocates violence toward its 
e.nemIe~: In !99.0 thIS orgamsatlOn declared its intentions to fight for Slovak 
nghts, to lIqUIdate the irredentists, the Hungarians, all enemies of the 
Slovaks, and the renegade Slovaks .... " Declaring its readiness to "use force 
when necessary", t~e SI?vak Republican Army threatened to destroy the 
property of Hunga~Ians In. Slovaki~, to pollute the Danube and the lower 
reaches of Slov~k nvers wIth chemIcal and bacteriological materials and to 
destr~y Hll:nganan go,?ds shipped into Slovak markets. 60 A threat ~f more 
orgamsed ~lOlence w~s Issued by the Greater Romania Party when it responded 
to an ethmc Hunganan de!lland ~or ~ referendum on self-determination for 
the Sze~lerland, a Hunganan regIon In Romania. According to the Greater 
Roman~a P.arty, .any threat to Romanian territorial integrity will be met by a 
Romaman InvaSIOn of Hungary. 61 
In the r~volutions of 1989, na~ionalism -. complete with all its assumptions 
about the Importance.of t.he ethmc commumty - was a positive force in helpin pro~uce a ~opular rejectIOn of the notion of East European membership in ~ 
~ovIet empIr~. !n most states of the region, nationalism, for a time, was an 
Im~ortant umfyIng eleT?en!, s~methin~ which helped bring a people together 
a~aInst unp~pular, SovIet. InspIred ~egImes. Few scenes illustrated this better 
t an ~omama~s a~d ~thmc !lunganans standing together against Ceausescu's 
secunty forces.In TImIsoara In December 1989. However once the revoluti 
were .acc?mpiished, nation~Iism's role changed as citi~ens began a pai~~~ 
eXamInatlOn of the foundatlOns of their political systems EthnI'c d' .. I d h" . IVISIveness 
rep ace. t e n.atIOnal coheSIOn briefly enjoyed by communities which were 
reassertlI~g theIr long suppressed national, ethnic or cultural identities. 
There IS a common Western tendency to assume that all problems are in 
search of a solution. Yet, in the case of East European ethnic strife there 
are ~any pr.oblems that do not lend themselves to a clear resoluti~n but 
reqUIre conSIstent, long-term management. Ethnic conflict is likely to b per~~n~nt featur~ of th~ regi.onal political landscape and, perhaps, the m~s~ 
oPtJmIstJ~ ~ture IS on~ In ~hIch the leaders hips of Eastern Europe learn not 
how to elImInate ethmc stnfe but how to live with it. 
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